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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1987 & Supp. 1991) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (e)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether Petitioner is a real property 
contractor for purposes of the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act, and therefore, liable for sales 
tax on its purchases of steel plate and other 
materials from Utah vendors. 
II. Whether imposition of Utah sales tax on 
Petitioner's purchases from Utah vendors, for 
which Petitioner will receive a tax credit in 
California, results in double taxation of 
Petitioner. 
III. Whether Petitioner is subject to a 15% 
penalty because it intentionally disregarded 
the instructions of the Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission and failed to 
pay Utah sales tax. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, this Court is governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act. The act provides that this Court shall grant 
relief only if the petitioning party can show substantial 
prejudice because "the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law," or "the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
& (g) (19 89 & Supp. 1991). This Court has determined that 
""Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion." Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake City Bd., 
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
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STATUTES, RULES & RESOLUTIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103(1) (1) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on: 
(a) The storage, use or other consumption in 
this state of tangible personal property 
purchased for storage, use, or other 
consumption in this state . . . . 
Tax Regulation S58 (1984)(Currently Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-
58S) 
a. Tangible personal property sold to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real 
property is generally subject to tax. The 
person who converts the personal property 
into real property is considered to be the 
consumer of the personal property since he is 
the last one to own it as personal property. 
The contractor or repairman is deemed to be 
the consumer of tangible personal property 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property regardless of the type of contract 
entered into, whether it is a lump sum, time 
and material or a cost-plus contract. The 
sale of real property is not subject to the 
tax nor is labor performed on real property 
subject to the tax. To give an example, the 
sale of a completed home or building is not 
subject to the tax, but the sale of materials 
and supplies to contractors and 
subcontractors are taxable transactions as 
sales to final consumers. 
c. Sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors for use in out-of-state jobs are 
taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in 
accordance with regulation S44. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(27) (1987 & Supp. 1991)). 
The storage, use, or other consumption in 
this state of the following tangible personal 
property is specifically exempted from the 
tax imposed by this chapter: 
(g) property whi^ ch enters into and becomes an 
ingredient or component part of the property 
which a person engaged in the business of 
manufacturing, compounding for sale, profit, 
or use manufactures or compounds . . . . 
Multistate Tax Compact, Article V, Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1 
(1953) (Currently Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987)). 
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be entitled 
to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes 
paid by him with respect to the same property 
to another state and any subdivision thereof. 
The credit shall be applied first against the 
amount of any use tax due the state, and any 
unused portion of the credit shall then be 
applied against the amount of any use tax due 
a subdivision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3)(b) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
(3) The penalty for underpayment of tax is as 
follows: 
(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to 
intentional disregard of law or rule, the 
penalty is 15% of the underpayment. 
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26 U.S.C. 6653 (1986 & Supp. 1991). 
(a) Negligence.-
(1) In general.- If any part of any 
underpayment (as defined in subsection (c)) 
of tax required to be shown on a return is 
due to negligence (or disregard of rules or 
regulations), there shall be added to the tax 
amount equal to 5 percent of the 
underpayment. 
(3) Negligence.- For purposes of this 
subsection, the term "negligence" includes 
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to 
comply with the provisions of this title, and 
the term "disregard" includes any careless, 
reckless, or intentional disregard. 
Resolution adopted by the Multistate Tax Commission at 1980 
Annual Meeting. 
WHEREAS, Article V of the Multistate Tax 
Compact provides that a credit shall be 
allowed against use tax liability for a sales 
or use tax paid in another state with respect 
to the same transaction; and 
WHEREAS, the question has arisen as to 
whether precedence in liability or in payment 
shall prevail as the determinant as to which 
state is required to allow the credit; and 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the 
Multistate Tax Commission has always 
interpreted said provision to mean that 
precedence in liability shall prevail over 
precedence in payment; and that the 
Multistate Tax Commission continues to do so 
and to recommend that all states abide by 
this interpretation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the assessment of Utah sales tax 
against Chicago Bridge & Iron Company ("Petitioner") for the 
period October 1, 1983, through December 31, 1985- For the 
period at issue, the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Auditing Division") assessed Petitioner Utah sales 
tax on its purchases from Utah vendors of steel plate and other 
materials used in constructing large storage tanks. 
On June 21, 1990, a formal hearing before the Utah 
State Tax Commission ("Respondent") was held. Transcript at 3. 
On February 13, 1991, based on the evidence and testimony 
presented at the hearing, Respondent issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of law, and Final Decision. Record at 53. In its 
decision, Respondent found that Petitioner engages in a number of 
activities at its Salt Lake facility, which, when acting in 
concert with one another, show that in its overall operations 
Petitioner is a "real property contractor" for purposes of the 
Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. Record at 57. Thus, Respondent 
upheld the Auditing Division's assessment of Utah sales tax on 
Petitioner's purchases from Utah vendors of steel plate and other 
materials used in the construction of its tanks. Idk Respondent 
rejected Petitioner's argument that credit should be given for 
taxes paid on the sales at issue to other states, and that 
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imposition of Utah sales tax constitutes double taxation. Id. 
On Kay 7, 1991, Respondent issued a supplemental order finding 
that imposition of a 15% penalty was appropriate because of 
Petitioner's intentional disregard of Utah law as made known to 
it by way of the Auditing Division's letter dated February 29, 
1984, which instructed Petitioner regarding Utah tax law and 
directed it to pay Utah sales tax on its future purchases. 
Petitioner now appeals to this Court for review of Respondent's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Final Decision and its 
supplemental order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioner's primary activity consists of the design, 
fabrication, and installation of large storage tanks, pressure 
vessels, and other large containers used for combining materials, 
hereinafter referred to as "storage tanks." Transcript at 24-29. 
Petitioner owns and operates facilities throughout the United 
States. During the period at issue, Petitioner operated one of 
its steel plate processing facilities in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Transcript at 16-17. 
Most of Petitioner's contracts are what may be commonly 
referred to as "furnish and install contracts" where Petitioner 
contracts with customers to produce, deliver, and install 
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customized storage tanks. Transcript at 10 & 37. Petitioner 
begins by purchasing steel plate and other raw materials from 
Utah vendors. Transcript at 7, At Petitioner's Salt Lake 
facility, the steel plate is cut and processed into components 
which fit together to form the desired storage tank. Transcript 
at 21 & 22. These components are transported to the customer's 
real property where, pursuant to contractual requirements, 
Petitioner's employees erect and weld the parts together and 
affix the storage tank to the customer's real property. 
Transcript at 22-23. 
Petitioner did not pay Utah sales tax on its purchases 
from Utah vendors of steel plate and other materials which it 
used in the construction of storage tanks. Record at 54. 
Rather, Petitioner billed its customers for tax at the final 
destination point and remitted it to the state in which the 
storage tank was installed. Record at 54. During the period at 
issue, Petitioner's contracts were primarily with customers in 
California. Transcript at 11. Hence, rather than pay Utah sales 
tax on its purchases from Utah vendors, Petitioner paid taxes to 
the state of California. Id. 
As a result of the ongoing disagreement between the 
parties, the Auditing Division sent Petitioner a letter, dated 
February 29, 1984, clarifying its position. Record at 98. The 
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letter informed Petitioner that: (1) a deficiency assessment 
covering the three year period ending June 30, 1975, had been 
resolved in Petitioner's favor on the condition that Petitioner 
would pay sales tax on its Utah purchases in the future; (2) 
under the Utah tax rules, Petitioner is liable for sales tax on 
its purchases of steel plate and other materials because it is 
the consumer of those materials; and (3) where a taxable 
transaction takes place in Utah prior to out of state use, Utah 
taxes must be paid first. Record at 98. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The person who converts personal property into 
real property is deemed the consumer of the property because that 
person is the last one to own it as personal property. Even 
though a segment of its operations involve the fabrication of 
steel plate, Petitioner is a real property contractor because its 
operations require it to fabricate and install large storage 
tanks upon its customer's real property. Petitioner's purchases 
are not exempt from Utah sales tax because exemptions are 
construed against the one so claiming and Petitioner's showing of 
a mere difference of opinion does not satisfy its burden of 
proving that it is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the 
Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. 
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II. Imposition of Utah sales tax upon Petitioner's 
purchases will not subject it to double taxation. Both Utah and 
California are members of the Multistate Tax Commission which 
provides that precedence in liability prevails over precedence in 
payment and that member states must give credit for taxes paid 
the state where the liability first arose. Double taxation will 
not result because Petitioner will receive a tax credit in 
California for sales tax paid to Utah, the state where the 
liability initially arose. 
III. The Auditing Division, in a letter dated February 
29, 1984, informed Petitioner that, as a consumer, it was liable 
for Utah sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors and 
directed it to pay Utah sales tax on all future purchases. 
Petitioner disregarded the Auditing Division's instructions and 
failed to pay Utah sales tax on the purchases at issue. Hence, 
the 15% penalty imposed by Respondent for the intentional 
disregard of Utah law should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS REAL A PROPERTY CONTRACTOR; ITS 
PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND OTHER MATERIALS ARE 
SUBJECT TO UTAH SALES AND USE TAX. 
The major issue of this appeal involves the taxation of 
steel plate and other materials purchased by Petitioner from Utah 
10 
vendors which were fabricated and erected into large tanks on its 
customer's property. Respondent determined from the evidence 
that Petitioner, as real property contractor, is the ultimate 
consumer of the steel plate and other materials it purchased. 
Therefore, Petitioner is liable for sales tax on its purchases of 
materials. Respondent's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence and case law. 
Under Utah law, a tax is levied on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for "[t]he storage, use, or other 
consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased 
for storage, use, or other consumption in this state . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103(l)(l) (1987 & Supp. 1991)). 
Tax Regulation S58 provides: 
a. Tangible personal property sold to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real 
property is generally subject to tax. The 
person who converts the personal property 
into real property is considered to be the 
consumer of the personal property since he is 
the last one to own it as personal property. 
The contractor or repairman is deemed to be 
the consumer of tangible personal property 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property regardless of the type of contract 
entered into, whether it is a lump sum, time 
and material or a cost-plus contract . . . . 
c. Sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors for use in out-of-state jobs are 
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taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in 
accordance with regulation S44. 
Tax Regulation S58 (1984)(emphasis added)(Currently Utah Code 
Admin. P. R865-19-58S). Unless sold in interstate commerce, any 
tangible personal property purchased for consumption in this 
state by a real property contractor is subject to Utah sales tax. 
Respondent found from the evidence that Petitioner, by 
fabricating and installing storage tanks outside of Utah, 
performed the work as a real property contractor. In its 
decision, Respondent stated: 
Although the Petitioner may indeed be 
engaged in manufacturing at its Salt Lake 
facility, the activities at that facility is 
but one of a number of different activities 
that the Petitioner is engaged in, which, 
when acting in concert with one another, show 
the Petitioner in its overall operation to be 
a "real property contractor•" 
In the present case, the evidence 
established that the Petitioner engages in 
designing, manufacturing, and final assembly 
of large steel products, which, when affixed 
to real property, become a fixture to that 
real property. 
Record at 56. Respondent's determination is supported by 
substantial evidence and case law. 
As the record indicates, Petitioner's contracts were 
"furnish and install" contracts whereby Petitioner contracted 
with customers to fabricate, erect and install specified storage 
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tanks on the client's real property. To fulfill these contracts, 
Petitioner first purchased steel plate and other materials from 
Utah vendors. At Petitioner's Salt Lake facility, the steel 
plate was cut and processed into storage tank components, which, 
when eventually assembled at the job site, would become a storage 
tank. Admittedly, this segment of Petitioner's operations may be 
described as a manufacturing process. However, as Respondent 
reasoned in its decision, "that determination . . . is not 
dispositive of the outcome of this case." Record at 56. Rather, 
it is the general scope of the a taxpayer's activities which 
determines whether it is a contractor and therefore a consumer of 
goods. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Sterling Custom Homes, 283 
N.W. 2d 573, 574 (Wis. 1979) . 
The components, while in some instances pieced together 
to check specifications, were never assembled and welded into the 
final structure at Petitioner's Salt Lake facility. Petitioner 
transported the components to the job site where it completed its 
contractual obligations by welding together the various tank 
components and affixing the tank to the customer's real property. 
Hence, Petitioner's activities, when viewed in their entirety, 
support the conclusion that it is a real property contractor. 
Case law also supports Respondent's conclusion that 
Petitioner is a real property contractor liable for sales tax on 
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its steel plate purchases from Utah vendors. Levine v. State Bd. 
of Equalization of the State of California, 299 P.2d 738 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Miedema Metal Building Systems, Inc., v. 
Department of Treasury, 338 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
In Levine the Appellant engineered, fabricated, and 
installed water cooling towers, aerial towers, and industrial 
wooden products especially designed for industrial companies. 
Appellant purchased raw materials from California vendors and 
processed them for subsequent erection and installation on 
customers' job sites outside of California. In rejecting 
Appellant's argument that imposition of taxes violated the 
Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, the court stated: 
The appellants were engaged in the business 
of constructing tanks and the items 
heretofore mentioned, which were fabricated 
pursuant to contracts to be erected on real 
property outside of the state. In our 
opinion they were, under the facts of these 
particular cases, contractors within the 
meaning of the law of this state, and were 
consumers. It was said in General Electric 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 111 
Cal.App.2d 180, 187, 244 P.2d 427, 431: v* * 
* Where the materials are combined with other 
materials so as to lose their identity and 
become part of the completed structure the 
contractor is deemed to be the consumer of 
such material * * *.' 
Id. at 743. 
In Miedema the appellant was a corporation that sold 
and constructed grain storage bins. The storage bins were 
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erected by the appellant on farms. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
upheld the Michigan Tax Tribunal's determination that because the 
taxpayer sold the storage bins and assembled them on the 
customer's real property, the taxpayer was a "contractor" and 
hence the "consumer" for purposes of the tax. The appellant was 
liable for payment of tax on the cost of the bins. Miedema, 338 
N.W.2d at 926 & 927. 
The evidence and case law both support Respondent's 
conclusion that Petitioner, as a real property contractor, is 
liable for sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors of steel 
plate and other materials used in the construction of storage 
tanks. 
A. PETITIONER'S PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND 
OTHER MATERIALS ARE NOT EXEMPT UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 59-16-4(g). 
Under Utah tax law, "property which enters into and 
becomes an ingredient or component part of the property which a 
person engaged in the business of manufacturing, compounding for 
sale, profit or use manufactures or compounds . . ."is exempt 
from Utah sales and use tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp. 
1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1987 & Supp. 
1991)). Petitioner argues that because it engages in some 
manufacturing operations at its Salt Lake facility that it's 
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purchases of steel plate and other materials were exempt from 
sales tax under section 59-16-4(g). However, Petitioner has 
failed to show that it is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of 
section 59-16-4(g). Rather, Petitioner merely establishes that a 
difference of opinion exists between itself and Respondent which 
is insufficient to qualify it for the exemption. 
Tax exemption statutes are narrowly construed against 
the taxpayer and thus Petitioner bears the burden of showing its 
entitlement to the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah 
State Tax Common, 617 P.2d 397 (1980). In Parsons, this Court, 
in rejecting the taxpayer's argument that fuels it used in 
reconstructing a causeway were exempt from Utah's Use Fuel Tax, 
stated: 
Even though taxing statutes should generally 
be construed favorable to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority, the 
reverse is true of exemptions. Statutes 
which provide for exemptions should be 
strictly construed, and one who so claims has 
the burden of showing his entitlement to the 
exemption. 
Id. at 398. Moreover, this burden is not met merely by showing a 
difference of opinion. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). In Container Corp., the Supreme 
Court stated: 
vThe general rule, applicable here, is that a 
taxpayer claiming immunity from a tax has the 
burden of establishing his exemption. This 
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burden is never met merely by showing a fair 
difference of opinion which as an original 
matter might be decided differently, . . .' 
Id. at 175-76 (quoting Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 
U.S. 534 (1951))(original emphasis). In order to qualify for the 
manufacturing exemption of section 59-16-4(g), Petitioner must 
show more than a mere difference in opinion between itself and 
Respondent. 
However, a mere difference of opinion is all that 
Petitioner has shown. Petitioner cites to portions of the record 
which establish nothing more than the fact that, in fulfilling 
its "furnish and install contracts," an isolated portion of its 
activities involve fabricating steel plate into storage tank 
components. Petitioner wholly overlooks the fact that its 
contracts further require it to transport those components to the 
customer's job site and erect and install the storage tank upon 
its customer's property. Because tax exemption statutes are 
construed strictly against the one claiming the exemption, 
Petitioner cannot broadly construe section 59-16-4(g) to include 
itself merely because an isolated portion of its activities 
involve steel plate processing. 
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II. RESPONDENT'S POSITION WILL NOT SUBJECT 
PETITIONER TO DOUBLE TAXATION AND IS NOT 
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT. 
Petitioner asserts that the Commission's Order subjects 
it to double taxation. Petitioner quotes extensively from 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 119 P.2d 945 (California 
1941) as supporting this argument. In that case, the California 
court upheld a use tax assessment against Petitioner, which was 
measured by the cost of materials Petitioner transported into and 
used in California. Petitioner had not paid sales or use tax on 
those materials to any other state. The main issue involved a 
question of whether the use tax constituted an impermissible 
burden on interstate commerce. The position urged by Petitioner 
was that it was not taxable at all because when goods are 
purchased in a foreign state, prefabricated and shipped to 
California in interstate commerce, to tax Petitioner on the cost 
of those materials would impose an invalid burden on interstate 
commerce. The court held that the use tax did not constitute an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The only issues 
decided were that the California State Board had imposed a use 
tax on the transaction, that such tax was valid, and that the tax 
was not an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. It did 
not address the issue here: whether Petitioner must pay taxes to 
18 
California to the exclusion of other states. This question is 
resolved by referring to the Multistate Tax Compact. 
Both Utah and California are members of the Multistate 
Tax Commission; both have adopted, and adhere to, the language of 
the Multistate Tax Compact. The question of double taxation is 
resolved pursuant to this agreement. Article V of the Compact 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1 (1953), currently Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987)) states: 
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be entitled 
to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes 
paid by him with respect to the same property 
to another state and any subdivision thereof. 
The Multistate Tax Commission has interpreted the above cited 
Article V to mean: 
WHEREAS, Article V of the Multistate Tax 
Compact provides that a credit shall be 
allowed against use tax liability for a sales 
or use tax paid in another state with respect 
to the same transaction; and 
WHEREAS, the question has arisen as to 
whether precedence in liability or in payment 
shall prevail as the determinant as to which 
state is required to allow the credit; and 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the 
Multistate Tax Commission has always 
interpreted said provision to mean that 
precedence in liability shall prevail over 
precedence in payment; and that the 
Multistate Tax Commission continues to do so 
and to recommend that all states abide by 
this interpretation. 
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Resolution adopted by Multistate Tax commission at 1980 annual 
meeting. 
Pursuant to Article V, California will give credit to 
Petitioner for taxes paid in Utah on the same purchases. During 
the periods at issue here, the tax liability arose first in Utah. 
California does not tax Petitioner until the materials enter that 
state. If Petitioner had properly paid tax in Utah, credit would 
have been allowed by California for the amounts paid here. No 
double taxation would have resulted. Precedence of liability 
prevails over precedence of payment. 
Petitioner should not confuse double payment with 
double taxation. Utah does not seek to doubly tax Petitioner, 
nor does California. Utah seeks only those taxes legally owed 
here, and if properly paid, such taxes will be given credit in 
California. If taxes have been erroneously paid to one state 
when legally due in another, a refund should be sought in the 
state where erroneously paid. 
Further, the Commission's position is not internally 
inconsistent as asserted by Petitioner in its brief. Utah will 
indeed assess a use tax on purchases of personal property made 
outside the state where it is shipped into the state for use, 
storage, or other consumption. However, where a sales tax has 
been paid to another state on the purchase of that personal 
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property, a credit against the use tax will be given by Utah for 
the amount of sales tax paid to that state. 
Finally, Petitioner cites to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(33), (1987 & Supp. 1991)(enacted in 1988)1, as granting an 
exemption for the types of purchases at issue. However, before 
Petitioner can claim that its purchases are exempt under section 
59-12-104(33), it must concede the primary issue of this appeal: 
that it is a real property contractor for purposes of the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act. Further, a full reading of subsection 33 
actually mandates taxation of Petitioner's purchases from Utah 
vendors. Subsection 33 exempts: 
sales of tangible personal property to 
persons within this state that is 
subsequently shipped outside the state and 
incorporated pursuant to contract into and 
becomes a part of real property located 
outside of this state, except to the extent 
that such other entity or political entity 
imposes a sales, use, or gross receipts, or 
other similar transaction excise tax thereon 
against which such other state or political 
entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by 
this chapter. 
California imposes a use tax on Petitioner based upon its use of 
materials brought into California but allows a credit under 
1
 It should be noted that the 1989 amendments to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104 added subsection (34)(currently section 59-12-
104(33)). Because this subsection of the code was amended after 
the date the issues arose in the case at bar, it should not be 
considered a controlling statute. Tummurru Trades v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 n. 10. (Utah 1990). 
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Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact for the taxes paid to 
Utah, Petitioner is therefore liable under subsection 33 and 
must pay Utah sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors and 
apply for a credit from California. 
III. PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO THE 15% PENALTY BECAUSE 
OF ITS INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF THE LAW. 
Under Utah law, a penalty is imposed for underpayment 
of taxes: 
The penalty for underpayment of tax is as follows: 
(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to 
intentional disregard of law or rule, the 
penalty is 15% of the underpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (a) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
Accordingly, Respondent imposed a 15% penalty upon Petitioner 
"based upon the Petitioner's apparent intentional disregard of 
law or rule as made known to it by way of the letter from the 
Commission dated February 29, 1984." Record at 35. The letter 
to wjiich Respondent referred, was a letter sent by the Auditing 
Division to Petitioner outlining its position on Petitioner's 
material purchases from Utah vendors. The letter, after 
referring to a previous assessment and settlement of that 
assessment in Petitioner's favor, advised Petitioner that where a 
taxable transaction takes place in Utah prior to use in another 
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state, Utah law must be satisfied regardless of other state law. 
Then, the letter, citing Tax Rule S-58 (Currently Utah Code 
Admin. P. R865-19-58S), advised Petitioner that real property 
contractors are deemed the final consumer of materials they 
purchase. Finally, the letter instructed Petitioner that it was 
to pay Utah sales tax on any future purchases from Utah vendors 
regardless of where the materials were used. Nevertheless, 
Petitioner ignored the Auditing Division's directive and failed 
to pay any sales tax on its purchases of materials used out of 
state. 
The term "intentional disregard," as it is used in 
section 59-1-401(3)(a), has been neither defined by the 
legislature nor interpreted by this Court. Therefore, it is 
instructive to look at the federal standard when imposing 
penalties for the nonpayment of tax. 
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a penalty for the 
underpayment of taxes when underpayment is due to the "disregard 
of rules or regulations." 26 USC § 6653(a)(1) (1986 & Supp. 
1991). For the purposes of section 6653(a), "the term 
'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or intentional 
disregard." 26 USC § 6653(a)(3) (1986 Supp. 1991). Further, 
when a penalty is assessed under section 6653(a)(3), the taxpayer 
bears the burden of proving that he did not intentionally 
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disregard rules and regulations. Marcello v. C.I.R., 380 F.2d 
499, 507 (5th Cir. 1967); accord, Masat v. C.I.R, 784 F.2d 573, 
576 (5th Cir. 1986) . 
In the present case, Petitioner failed to prove it did 
not intentionally disregard Utah tax regulations. The letter 
evidences a long standing disagreement between the Auditing 
Division and Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax. Further, it 
indicates that the Auditing Division made repeated efforts to get 
Petitioner to comply with Utah sales tax law. Despite the 
Auditing Division's efforts, Petitioner neither paid sales tax on 
the purchases at issue nor sought further clarification of the 
matter with the Auditing Division. Using the standard set forth 
in section 6653(a), Petitioner's actions demonstrate an 
intentional disregard of the law. 
In its brief, Petitioner, cites to 26 USC § 
6651(a)(1986 & Supp. 1991), which imposes a penalty for failing 
to file a return or to pay the amount shown on a filed return. 
Under section 6651(a), a penalty is not imposed if the failure to 
file a return or pay the amount shown on a return was due to 
"reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." However, 
section 6651(a) does not directly apply to the case at bar 
because it deals with situations where the taxpayer has either 
failed to file a return or has filed a return but not paid the 
24 
amount due as shown on the return. Petitioner cannot demonstrate 
that its nonpayment of Utah sales tax was not due to "willful 
neglect," but due to "reasonable cause." 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute and held 
that "reasonable cause" calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that 
he exercised "ordinary business care and prudence." U.S. v. 
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985). Further, as used within section 
6651, ""willful neglect' may be read as meaning a conscious, 
intentional failure or reckless indifference." Id. 
Petitioner argues that by relying upon Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. Johnson, 119 P.2d 945 (California 1941), and paying 
taxes to California, it was exercising "ordinary business care 
and prudence," and hence should not be subject to the 15% 
penalty. Reliance upon a single case which did not address the 
issue of whether Utah sales tax was due in opposition to the 
Auditing Division's express ruling, can hardly constitute 
"ordinary business care and prudence." Rather, a prudent 
business person in Petitioner's situation would have, with 
minimal effort, discovered that California is a member of the 
Multistate Tax Commission and would have given credit for payment 
of Utah sales tax. Petitioner's actions evidence a "conscious, 
intentional failure or reckless indifference" toward compliance 
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with Utah law. Therefore, even under the standard of section 
6651(a), the imposed 15% penalty should be upheld. 
Petitioner, a multistate corporation that constantly 
deals with interstate taxing transactions, is hard pressed to 
argue that its nonpayment of Utah sales tax was due to anything 
but an "intentional disregard" of Utah law. Hence, the 15% 
penalty imposed by Respondent should be affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent found from the testimony and the evidence 
presented at the formal hearing that Petitioner's activities, 
when viewed in their entirety, show it to be a real property 
contractor. Because real property contractors are deemed the 
consumers of the tangible personal property they purchase, 
Petitioner is liable for Utah sales tax on its purchases of steel 
plate and other materials purchased from Utah vendors. 
Petitioner's purchases do not qualify for a 
manufacturing exemption merely because some of its activities 
involve steel plate processing. Tax exemption statutes are 
narrowly construed against the one claiming an exemption and 
Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it is a 
"manufacturer" within the meaning of the Utah Sales and Use Tax 
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Act. Petitioner has not met its burden by merely showing a 
difference of opinion between itself and the Auditing Division. 
Respondent's position will not subject Petitioner to 
double taxation and it is not internally inconsistent. Utah and 
California are both members of the Multistate Tax Commission 
which requires member states to give credit for taxes paid to the 
state in which the tax liability first arose. Petitioner's 
liability for Utah sales tax arose first when it purchased steel 
plate to construct storage tanks before any liability ever arose 
in California. Hence, Petitioner is not eligible for a tax 
credit in Utah for taxes paid to California. Rather, Petitioner 
must pay Utah sales tax on its purchases and seek a credit or 
refund for taxes paid to the state of California. 
Petitioner was fully aware of its Utah sales tax 
liability. The letter from the Auditing Division, dated February 
29, 1984, instructed Petitioner regarding Utah law and directed 
it to pay Utah sales tax on all of its future purchases of steel 
plate and other materials. However, Petitioner disregarded the 
Auditing Division's directive and failed to pay Utah sales tax on 
the purchases at issue. Petitioner's intentional disregard of 
Utah law justifies imposition of the 15% penalty. 
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For the forgoing reasons, Respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Final Decision and its supplemental order. 
Dated this ffi ' day of October, 1991. 
.^«.yDE\JER 
Assistant Attorney General 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, first class, postage prepaid, to: 
Ronald G. Moffitt 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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